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INSURANCE
HERBERT A. KUVINO
Since the last survey of this subject' the Florida Supreme Court re-
ported nineteen decisions, and the federal court twenty-two opinions. The
federal courts follow the substantive law of Florida; 2 therefore consideration
is given herein to all decisions without specific distinction.
Both tribunals follow the established principles applicable to insurance
matters. However, at times, in the application of these principles there
appear to be some variances. Study must necessarily be made of the facts,
the terms and provisions of the contracts of insurance and the actions
of the parties to the contract or policy before, during and after the occur-
rence of the event insured against.
STATE REGULATIONS
There were no cases decided by the Florida courts during this period
which considered the regulation of insurance companies. Neither the
Florida statutes, the regulations promulgated by the Insurance Commis-
sioner pertaining to the regulatory authority nor the validity of such
authority was considered during this period. However, the federal courts
of other jurisdictions considered matters which directly affect the rights
of the states to regulate insurance companies. While the United States
Supreme Court had not stated whether the states will be permitted to
continue their regulation this determination will most certainly be submitted
for decision.3
SCOPE AND COVERAGE OF POLICIES
The relative rights and obligations of the parties to insurance policies
are primarily determined by and from the terms and provisions of the
insurance contract. Thus, the principles of construction of insurance con-
tracts are of primary consideration. Insurance policies, similar to other
contracts, are construed and interpreted, where the language is plain and
unambiguous, in accordance with the plain and accepted meaning of the
words. The primary object is to ascertain the intention of the parties.4 The
(*) Professor of Law and Director of Insurance Law Training Programs and Con.
ferences, University of Miami School of Law.
1. 10 MIAMI L.Q. 360 (1956).
2. Equitable Life Assur. Soc'y. v. NeilI, 243 F.2d 193 (5th Cir. 1957).
3. cf. The American Hospital and Life Ins. Co. v. FTC, 243 F.2d 719 (5th Cir.
1957); National Cas. Co. v. FTC, 245 F.2d 883 (6th Cir. 1957) wherein the issue is
squarely presented under the McCarran Act 59 STAT. 33 (20) §§ I-5 (1945), 15 U.S.C.
§§ 1011.1015 (1952). However, note the language in Wilbun Boat Co. v. Fireman's
Fund Ins. Co., 348 U.S. 310 (1955).
4. Haenal v. United States Fidelity and Guaranty Co., 88 So.2d 888 (Fla. 1956).
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court cannot, under the guise of coflstruction, make a new contract for
the parties.' Where there is an ambiguity, or the language is not clearly
indicative of the intention of the parties, the court in its determination
of the intention of the parties, construes the contract against the insurer
and in favor of the insured.0 The courts attempt to favor the position of
the insured with a determination that he has insurance, if it is possible
to construe the intention of the parties to that effect. T
Exemptions
Where a policy provided that burglary safe insurance was effective
only if property was feloniously abstracted from a safe, there was no re-
covery if the safe was feloniously taken from insured's premises where nc
proof was submitted that the contents of the safe were feloniously ab
stracted. By implication, all risks not specifically provided for in the policy,
the terms of which were not ambiguous, were expressly exempted or
excluded."
Exclusions
The same rule of law applied to policy provisions which specifically
excluded certain hazards or risks from the coverage of the contract; basically,
this is good law. Where a person undertakes to obligate himself in broad,
general, all-inclusive language, it is proper that he limit such obligation by
specific exclusions?
Where an attempt was made to include a vehicle in the coverage of
a fleet policy, where the type of vehicle was excluded by the terms of the
contract, such an attempt would be considered abortive if the person was a
broker and not an agent of the insurance company.10
In another matter, there was an attempt to include in a garage liability
policy the loss or damage to the insured customer's property while in the
custody of the insured. The court found that a specific exclusion existed in the
policy with reference to this hazard or coverage and that since the insured
did not pay any premium for this excluded coverage, although provision
5. Ibid.
6. Chaachou v. American Cent. Ins. Co., 241 F.2d 889 (5th Cir. 1957); Weis-
Fricker Export and Import Corp. v. Hartford Aec. and Ins. Co., 143 F. Supp. 137 (ND.
Fla. 1956); New Amsterdam Cas. Co. v. Knowles, 95 So,2d 413 (Fla. 1957); Moore v.
General Cas. Co., 91 So.2d 341 (Fla. 1956); Praetorians v. Fisher, 89 So.2d 329 (Fla.
1956); Haenal v. United States Fidelity and Guaranty Co., 88 So.2d 888 (Fla. 1956);
Virginia Surety Co. v. Russ, 86 So.2d 643 (Fla. 1956); Service Fire Ins. Co. v. Markey,
83 So.2d 855 (Fla. 1955).
7. Note 4 suora.
8. Moore v. General Gas. Co., 91 So.2d 341 (Fla. 1956).
9. Note 4 supra.
10. Pacific Employers Ins. Co. v. A. J. Peddy & Sons, Inc., 144 F. Supp. 632(S.D. Fla. 1956).
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had been made in the policy for the purchase of such coverage, the policy
did not insure for the risk or hazard excluded."
Likewise in a life insurance policy which exempted double indemnity
for accidental death, if the death did not result "solely through external,
violent and accidental cause," the beneficiary could not prove the death to
be within the terms of the exclusion primarily because a pre-existing health
condition was a contributing factor to the assured's death, despite the fact
that rough treatment by robbers was the cause of the death.12
In a suit for a declaratory decree the court held that an attendant
of a convalescent home was not such a person within the intent of the
exclusion as to absolve the insurer from liability for "professional services"
performed or supplied at such home.' 3 The decision was predicated on the
principle of a liberal construction in favor of the insured.
An insurance broker, who had no authority to represent an insurance
company and who negotiated with the insurer's agent for the policy of
insurance, lacked authority to extend coverage to his client (the insured)
to include liability expressly excluded from the policy.'4 The general law of
contracts, to the effect that there must be an apparent meeting of the minds
by the parties to a contract effected by them or their duly authorized agents,
was utilized to preserve the right of the insurer to exclude hazards or risks.
Conditions
The same rules of law that pertain to the validity of exemptions and
exclusions also apply to conditions in insurance contracts whether precedent
or subsequent. Where a fire insurance policy contained a provision pro-
hibiting the insured from having or taking out any additional fire insurance
on the insured property, violation of this prohibition voided the policy.'5
Cancellation
Cancellation of insurance contracts is governed by the same principles
as that applicable to other contracts. The terms of the agreement are
construed to give effect to the intention of the parties. If the method
agreed upon and the procedure set forth have been pursued, the courts
will decree effective cancellation. In one case, a judgment in favor of the
insured was reversed on the basis that no jury question was involved when
the facts indicated that the insurer complied with the cancellation provision
of the policy before the loss occurred by sending the notice of cancellation to
the insured to the address shown in the policy. The notice was sent by
11. See note 4 supra.
12. Berg v. New York Life Ins. Co., 88 So.2d 915 (Fla. 1956).
13. New Amsterdam Cas. Co. v. Knowles, 95 So.2d 413 (Fla. 1957).
14. Peddy v. Pacific Employers Ins. Co., 246 F.2d 306 (5th Cir. 1957).
15. Hunter v. United States Fidelity and Guaranty Co., 86 So.2d 421 (Fla. 1956).
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ordinary mail. The court held the terms to be unambiguous and that they
should be construed according to their plain intent. Registered mail or the
failure to prove receipt were not contractual requirements; hence no jury
issues were raised. 10 In a maritime case, the insured, owner of the boat,
financed his premium payments with a bank and authorized the bank to
cancel the policy, on his behalf, upon his default in the payments of his
installments. He regularly defaulted in installment payments, and upon
each default the bank sent notices of cancellation to the insurance company.
However, a short time after each cancellation was sent, the bank rescinded
such cancellation requests, which recissions were honored by the insurance
company. Finally, notice of cancellation was sent, the boat was destroyed
by fire, this cancellation request was held in abeyance by the insurer and then
the insurer, learning for the first time that the insured boat was destroyed
by fire, refused payment of the loss on the basis that the policy was cancelled
before the loss. It was held, "request for cancellation of an insurance policy
must be unequivocal and absolute." In the instant case, last notice, by
custom and usage between the parties was not sufficient. 7
MAKING THE CONTRACT
Premiums
Premiums are part of the consideration for the contract of insurance.
Unless a premium is paid, the policy does not take effect as to any or all
coverages therein. Where, in a garage liability insurance policy, no premium
was provided for or paid as to "liability for injury to, or destruction of property
owned by, rented to, in charge of insured, etc.," the insured had no coverage,
since there was no contractual agreement between the parties as to this
coverage."' The Florida statutes' provide for nonforfeiture premium pay-
ment grace periods and where there is any conflict between the policy
provisions and the statutory requirements, the latter control. In a case where
a weekly premium accident policy contained no grace period provision, the
court held there was a mixed question of law and fact, based upon the acts
of the parties, as to which grace period should be deemed applicable, and
the case was-remanded for a retrial.2 0
16. Service Fire Ins. Co. v. Markey, 83 So.2d 855 (Fla. 1955).
17. Saskatchewan Government Ins. Office v. Padgett. 245 F.2d 48 (5th Cir. 1957).
18. Note 4 supra.
19. As to accident policies, FLA. STAT. § 642.10 (1957) states that policies shall be
construed as though the terms and provisions of § 642 are set forth in such policies and
any terms or provisions in the policies to the contrary notwithstanding. § 642.031 (4) (c)
provides for a grace period of not less than 7 days for weekly premium policies.
20. Cuilford v. Conger Life Ins. Co., 92 So.2d 625 (Fla. 1957). The court split
4 to 3 with a dissenting opinion by Justice Hobson, concurred in by other dissenters, who
maintained that insured was injured more than the statutory 7 days after premium default
and policy had lapsed and no jury question existed.
1958]
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Application
The application for insurance is considered the offer by the assured.
Where an answer was inserted in an application without the knowledge or
consent of the insured, it was held that the inserted answer was not that
of the insured and therefore did not constitute any part of the offer for
insurance. This rule applies with equal force in life insurance applications 2'
and in casualty or liability policies.22
Insurable Interest
A tenant under a lease and option to purchase agreement entered into
with the Govcrnmncnt was required by the terms of the lease to take insurance
on the leased property. It had an insurable interest under this lease and
option to purchase not only in the property leased, but also as to the
property installed by it on the leased property. A cancellation of the lease
by the Government, done in accordance with the terms of the lease agree-
ment, after a loss had been sustained, did not terminate the assured's Tight
to the proceeds of insurance for its interest and loss as of the time of the
loss.2 3 Its insurable interest was not terminated by the end of the lease
since the tenant's right had accrued before such termination. Where a
vendor entered into a contract for the sale of realty and the vendee was
made an additional assured on the existing fire insurance policy, the vendee
had a valid insurable interest pending consummation of the sale.
24
Agency
The general law of agency, while very helpful in insurance cases, is
not determinative of the question of whose agent the person was. Since
insurance is a business affected with a public interest,25 statutory regulations
relative thereto influence determinations respecting its transactions. How-
ever, custom and usage developed over the long history of the insurance
business, also exert strong influence in the determination of legal principles
applicable to insurance transactions. A "general insurance broker" not
duly authorized by the insurance company that issued the policy, is legally
the agent of the insured, and not the agent of the company by estoppel.
21. Woodmen of the World Life Ins. Soc'y. v. Jackson, 243 F.2d 558 (5th Cir.
1957), where insured signed a blank application, which was filled in incorrectly by agent
of society. Held, no false answers by insured, so as to invalidate policy.
22. Providence Washington Ins. Co. v. Rabinowitz, 227 F.2d 300 (5th Cir. 1955).
The insertion of information by insurance company's agent in Jewelers Block Policy ap-
plication, which was furnished him by insured, or his misunderstanding of situation, was
not a warranty, the breach of which would avoid the policy.
23. Seaboard Mach. Corp. v. Hanover Fire Ins. Co., 149 F. Supp. 362 (ND. Fla.
1957)24. National Fire Ins. Co. v. Board of Public Instruction, 239 F.2d 370 (5th
Cir. 1956).
25. O'Gorman & Young v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 282 U.S. 251 (1931); German
Alliance Ins. Co. v. Lewis, 233 U.S. 389 (1914).
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He could not, therefore, bind the insurance company by any representations
made by him26 notwithstanding general and specific statutory definitions
of "agents," "solicitors" and "brokers" or the statutory attempt to make
them prima facie the alter ego of the insurers.28 The rights existing between
agents and companies, inter se, is treated hereinafter under the heading
of Rights of Parties.
CONCEALMENT, REPRESENTATIONS, AND WARRANTIES
Florida follows the common law since it has no statutory provisions
relating to this aspect of insurance law. Violation of these common law
rules by the insured precludes him from recovery on his insurance contract, 20
It is immaterial whether the violation by the insured is as to circumstances
surrounding the making of the contract and therefore pertaining to war-
ranties, concealment or the misrepresentation of material facts upon which
the contract was entered into, or a violation of good faith or breach of
covenants, conditions, or warranties after the contract is in force. The
violation of a policy provision not to take out any additional fire insurance
on the insured property, even though such other insurance existed before
the policy in question was entered into, precluded assured's right to recover
thereon,30 . Fraud and false swearing after a loss, on subject matter which
is material to the insurance or the nature and extent of the loss, will avoid
the policy and prevent recovery by the insured, since utmost good faith is
required of the insured both after a loss and before the contract is made.3'
Utmost good faith has always been the prime ingredient of insurance
transactions, but unfortunately, somewhere in the maze of judicial con-
sideration of insurance cases, and in the anxiety of the legislatures and courts
to protect the rights of insureds, the rights of the insurers, as parties to
the contracts, were often forgotten.8la
Even in marine insurance, where there is usually some appearance of
strict interpretation of warranties to the advantage of the insureds, the court
26. Pacific Employers Ins. Co. v. A. J. Peddy & Sons, Inc., 144 F. Supp. 632 (S.D.
Fla. 1956), aff'd in 246 F.2d 306 (5th Cir. 1957).
27. FLA. STAT. § 625.01 (1957).
28. Centennial Ins. Co. v. Parnell. 83 So.2d 688 (Fla. 1955). The statute does not
conclusively fix the scope of authority between agents, companies and third parties.
29. See note 15 supra.
30. Ibid.
31. Chaachou v. American Cent. Ins. Co., 241 F.2d 889, 893 (5th Cir. 1957):
Courts have long recognized that, "The moral hazard is one of the main
elements, if not the chief element, of an insurance risk, and it is never
negligible. It is always material to the risk," Connecticut Fire Ins. Co.
v. Manning, 160 F. 382, 385 (8th Cir. 1908). It reflects the assump-
tion that the relationship created by the contract is one requiring the
utmost honest, good faith dealing. Globe & Rutgers Fire Ins. Co. v.
Stallard, 68 F.2d 237,240 (4th Cir. 1934) ...
31a. Stipchich v. Insurance Co., 277 US. 311, 316 (1928); 48 S. Ct. 512
(1928); even from the time of Lord Mansfield's pronouncement in (1766); Carter v.
Boehm, 3 Burr. 1905, 1 Bl. 593, 97 Eng. Reprint 1164, has this principle of utmost
faith been recognized as valid law.
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in considering an action for breach of warranty of seaworthiness of the in-
sured vessel indicated that utmost good faith on the part of the insured was
required .1
False answers in the application for insurance will avoid the application
and the policy of insurance based thereon, unless it is shown that the
insured did not utter, ratify or in any way participate in their creation.33
This is just another manner of indicating that the insured did not breach
the good faith required of him, although the court placed its determination
upon the basis that the company waived any rights accruing to it
stemming from the wrong information in the application.
WAIVER AND EsioPPEL
In the construction of insurance contracts or the determination of
the relative rights of the parties to the controversy, the courts often rely
upon waiver or estoppel in their attempt to dispense substantial justice.
Effects of fraudulent representations in applications for life insurance can
be nullified by proof that the company's representative, with knowledge of
the facts, inserted the improper answers, 4 Exclusions in policies, i.e.,
lack of insurance coverage, may be waived, although it was determined that
the insurance broker was not the agent of the insurer and had no authority
to waive on behalf of the insurer.A An examination of an applicant by an
insurance company's medical examiner waives any future contentions as
to the applicant's health at or prior to the time of the examination."
Subrogation rights and settlement with knowledge of a finance company's
director and inaction to enforce such rights is a waiver of the rights. 37 An
insurer is estopped to take advantage of a misstatement in a policy proposal
made without the knowledge and consent of the insured by a unilateral
mistake or by willful act of the insurer's agent."8 The insertion of false
answers by the insurer's agent in an application for life insurance, even if
insured signs such application in blank and thereby permits or creates
the situation, will estop the insurer from relying on such misrepresentations. 9
Where the beneficiary of a life isurance policy kills the insured, public
32. Saskatchewan Gov't. Ins. Office v. Spot Pack, 242 F.2d 385, 388 (5th Cir.
1957), speaking of the effect of the warranty in that case, said:
. . . It is, rather, stated in the negative, that the Owner, from bad faith
or neglect, will not knowingly permit the vessel to break ground in an
unseaworthy condition. And, unllike a breach of a warranty of continuing
seaworthiness, express or implied, which avoids the policy altogether, the
consequence of a violation of this 'negative' burden is merely a denial
of liability for loss or damage caused proximately by such unseaworthiness.
33. Note 21 supra.
34. New York Life Ins. Co. v. Strudel, 243 F.2d 90 (5th Cir. 1957).
35. Note 26 supra.
36. Mathews v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., S9 So.2d 641 (Fla. 1956).
37. Lake City Auto Finance Co. v. Waldron, 83 So.2d 877 (Fla. 1955).
38. Note 22 supra.
39. Note 21 supra.
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policy estops her from the right to recover the proceeds of the policy by
virtue of the common law axiom that no person is permitted to benefit from
his own wrong.40 A reading of any of these cases will clearly demonstrate
that the courts are overworking the doctrines of waiver and estoppel
especially since sufficient other principles of law exist to obtain the same
results. It is the constant resort to the equitable doctrines of "waiver and
estoppel," regardless of whether it is one or the other, that has caused con-
fusion and loose application of one doctrine for the other erroneously. In
many instances the courts call them one, when it was not essential to resort
to either or both doctrines.
RIGHTS OF PARTIES
Policyholders-Insureds
Aside from the law of construction of insurance policies and the terms
and provisions thereof, insureds' rights have been determined under certain
circumstances and policy contracts.
Whether a seventy year old dentist remained totally and permanently
disabled was a question of fact for determination by the jury.41
A vendor under a contract of sale could recover insurance proceeds up
to the balance of the contract price for a fire which occurred prior to
consummation of the sale. The vendee, an additional insured, was entitled
to the balance of the proceeds. 42
Under a weekly premium accident insurance policy, which contained
no provisions as to premium grace periods, the court determined that the
insured had at least the statutory period and that a jury question arose as
to what was a reasonable time for such grace period. In other words, it was
for the jury to decide whether the insurance policy lapsed under the
conditions .43
Fraud and false swearing occurring after and pertaining to a loss, in
connection with any matter of insurance, such as indicates that insured
did not act with the utmost good faith, will result in a loss of rights under
a policy.44
One situation, that of a casualty insurance company's liability in excess
of policy limits for failure to settle a claim against an insured, has become
the subject of discussion4 5 and judicial determination. Evidence of bad
faith is a jury question and is not to be determined by the court on motion
when it concerns a company's action in failing to settle a claim of an
40. Carter v. Carter, 88 So.2d 153 (Fla: 1956).
41. Note 2 supra.
42. National Fire Ins. Co. v. Board of Public Instruction, 239 F.2d 370 (5th Cir.
1956). See also Note, 11 MIAMI L.Q. 531 (1957).
43. Note 20 supra.
44. Note 6 supra.
45. Applernan, Conflicts in Injury Defenses, 31 FiA. B.J. 402 (1957).
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injured person against the insured, thereby resulting in a trial and jury
verdict in excess of policy coverage limits. 46 The District Court for the
Southern District of Florida was reversed and the cause remanded for proper
procedure, relative to an action for damages against the insurance company
for failure to settle a claim against the insured, and the court reiterated
the principle that the company is at least under a duty to exercise good
faith in the settlement of a claim against the insured. 47
Beneficiary
Who is a beneficiary under the terms of a policy of life insurance was
determined to encompass the word beneficiary in its broadest legal aspect,
and in that sense has'reference to the survival of a beneficiary eligible to
take.48  Therefore, where the designated beneficiary in a life insurance
policy becomes ineligible to receive the policy proceeds, either through death
or common law disqualification because she murdered the insured, the courts
will examine the entire insurance policy to ascertain the intention of the
insured and will resort to the same legal principles of ascertainment as in
matters conceming testamentary documents and instruments of trust.49
Where an insured, under the terms of a National Service Life policy,
has become permanently and totally disabled, and has been so declared
by the Veteran's Administration relative to his receipt of service incurred
disability benefits, but has failed to notify the Veteran's Administration
Insurance Division that he is entitled to the benefit of the waiver of
premium provision in his policy and then dies with his premiums in default,
the beneficiary of the policy is not entitled to a retroactive waiver of
premiums. The benefit of this provision is lost by the failure of the insured
to make timely application therefor.50
In an action of interpleader instituted by the insurance company, the
court found that the deceased insured had changed the beneficiary from that
of his wife to some other person. Such action was not the result of duress
or undue influence but was a voluntary act by the insured. The court
directed the company to pay the proceeds of the policy to the last designated
person as the changed beneficiary."
Where a statute5 2 provides that proceeds of an insurance policy payable
to the estate of an insured could be bequeathed to any person, such proceeds
were held exempt from the claims of creditors of the insured. They belonged
46. Springer v. Citizens Cas. Co., 246 F.2d 123 (5th Cir. 1957).
47. Dotschay v. National Mnt. Ins. Co., 246 F.2d 221 (5th Cir. 1957).
48. Note 40 supra.
49. Ibid.
50. United States v. Sinor, 238 F.2d 271 (5th Cir. 1956).
51. Equitable Life Assur. Soc'y. v. Nichols, 84 So.2d 500 (Fla. 1955).
52. FLA. STAT. § 223.13 (1957).
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to the three surviving sisters of the deceased who were his sole surviving
heirs and the residuary legatees of his estate. 3
Creditors of Insured
The proceeds of an insurance policy are exempt from all claims of
the creditors of the insured,"4 even though the policy makes the proceeds
payable to the insured's estate. When these proceeds come into the hands
of the executors or administrators, they are, however, subject to costs of
administration of the estate.
A bank or finance company, which loans money that the insured uses
for premium payments has no right in, to, or relative to the insurance
contract, unless these rights are expressly provided for, either by endorse-
ment on the policy or by agreement between the bank and the insured, with
notice to the insurance company. 55
Landlord and Tenant
Both the landlord and the tenant have insurable interests in property,
the landlord by virtue of his ownership, and the tenant since he, too, has
an estate in the property. Each may insure his interest in property and the
other can claim nothing from the proceeds of such insurance, unless the
policy covers the other's interest 86 The courts will prorate the proceeds in
accordance with the interest of each, if the policy insures the interest of both.
Owner and Mortgagee
The same principles apply as in landlord and tenant cases. 7
Vendor and Vendee
The same principles apply as in landlord and tenant cases. 8
Assignees
The assignee of an insurance policy, unless the assignment is acknowl-
edged and acquiesced in by the insurer, has no rights under such contract.
An insurance policy is an agreement only between the parties thereto, the
insurer and insured. However, once an assignment is recognized by the
insurer, an assignee acquires all of the insured's rights therein.5 9
53. Estate of Frank Mitchell, 96 So.Zd 661 (Fla. 1957).
54. Ibid. See also note 53 supra.
55. Note 17 supra.
56. Note 23 sura.
57. Note 17 supra.
58. National Fire Ins. Co. v. Board of Public Instruction, note 42 supra.
59. Note 17 supra.
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Agents
Aside from the relationship of the agent to the public, Florida looks
to the contract which establishes the agency to determine the relative
rights of the agent and the insurance company. Such contracts are con-
strued according to the usual principles and the agent may be held re-
sponsible for an accounting.Y0 A determination may be made by declaratory
proceedings of an agent's rights to commission on renewal premiums. 61
An agent has no vested rights in commissions on renewal premiums, and
his right to such commissions must be based entirely upon the terms
of his contract.8 2
Excess Insurer
An insured carried primary insurance with one company and excess
insurance with another. As a result of a claim for injuries asserted by a
third party in excess of the primary insurance coverage, which resulted in
a judgment against insured for such excess, much litigation resulted by
reason of the assertions of the parties as to their respective rights. The
court construed the excess insurance policy in accordance with the plain
meaning of the language thereof and held that the insured had failed to
give timely notice to the excess carrier. This failure to give notice relieved
it from any obligation under the terms of its policy.
Total or Partial Disability
Where a policy provided that total and permanent disability existed
when insured was prevented from doing any work, insured was not required
to remain completely idle to be entitled to benefits, He could confine his
activities either to his home or to recreational pursuits and had a right to
make investments, or could perform occasional tasks without pay so long
as these activities did not impair his health. This is a jury question in
each case.64 However, where the insured in an action on a policy failed
to move for a directed verdict in his favor, and permitted the case to be
submitted to the jury with a charge to the jury which he helped prepare,
he had no grounds for appeal if the jury decided the issue against him.15
Therefore, it appears clear, that in actions on accident or health insurance
policies, issues of fact are to be treated the same as issues of fact in any other
type of litigation.
60. Meehan v. Grimaldi & Grimaldi, Inc., 240 F.2d 775 (5th Cir. 1957).
61. Frank 0. Pruitt, Inc. v. Southern Underwriters, 83 So.2d 115 (Fla. 1955).
62. Ibid.
63. American Fidelity and Cas. Co. v. Greyhound Corp., F.2d 89 (5th Cir. 1956);
Greyhound Corp. v. Excess Ins. Co., 233 F.2d 630 (5th Cir. 1956); Greyhound Lines
v. Jones, 60 So.2d 396 (Fla. 1956).
64. Note 2 supra.
65. Stokes v. Continental Assur. Co., 242 F.2d 893 (5th Cir. 1957).
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Lack of Insured's Cooperation
When an insured fails to cooperate with the insurance company,
especially where the contract requires such cooperation, the insurer is
absolved of its obligations under the policy. By the same reasoning, where
the insured has been guilty of fraud and false swearing in relation to the
extent of the damage under a windstorm policy, the law will not regard
it as unsound that such insured has lost the benefit of the contract by his
willful, immoral, dishonest acts which the contract itself condemns.66
UNAUTHORIZED INSURER'S SERVICE OF PROCESS
Where insured was not a resident of Florida at the time of application
for and the issuance of a policy and there had been no communications
or transactions by way of payment of premiums or otherwise between the
insured and the foreign insurer during insured's residence in Florida prior
to his death, service of process on either the Insurance Commissioner67
or on the Secretary of State 8 was invalid. There was no showing of any
activity in Florida of the insurer connected with the policy prior to the
death of the insured.69
SUBROGATION
Aside from the insurer's right to subrogation in workmen's compensa-
tion cases, which is not within the scope of this article, insurers of property
damage losses are entitled to be subrogated to the rights of the insured
upon payment of the insured's claim70 However, where a finance company
notified a truck owner and his insurer of its claim prior to a settlement
effected with a conditional buyer and the trucker's insurance agent notified
the finance company that he would include it in the settlement check
if it would not jeopardize the settlement he was about to make with the
conditional buyer, and the insurer thereupon settled and took a complete
release from the conditional buyer, the finance company had been put on
notice that the insurer was likely to make separate settlement with its
conditional buyer. The finance company, having taken no appropriate
action to protect its interest in the property, was barred by the settlement.7 '
In a subrogation action by a Mexican insurer against a Florida resident
third party wrongdoer, the court permitted recovery at the rate of exchange
in effect on the date of collision.72
66. Chaachou v. American Cent. Ins. Co., suora note 6.
67. FLA. STAT. §§ 625.28, 625.30 (2) (1957).
68. FLA. STAT. § 47.16 (1957).
69. Baker v. Commercial Travelers Mut. Acc. Ass'n., 150 F. Supp. 725 (S.D.
Fla. 1955).
70. 46 C.J.S., Insurance § 1209 (1946).
71. Note 37 supra.
72. La Interamericana, S. A. v. The Narco, 146 F. Supp. 270 (S.D. Fla. 1956).
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
WORDS AND PHRASES
During the period covered by this survey, the courts have defined
the following words and phrases: "attendant," 73 "beneficiary," 7 4 "continued
insurability," 75 "convalescent home,"' 6 "dishonesty," 77 "in charge of,"78s
"no beneficiary surviving,"7 9 "professional services,"8 0 "total and permanent
disability,"'" "valued policy,"8 2 "solely through external means,"'8 3
ATTORNEY'S FEES
Florida is one of the few states which has a statutory provision 4 allowing
the award of attorney's fees to the claimants in actions on insurance policies.
Where a policy of insurance was delivered in Ohio, a state which had no
statutory provision as to attorney's fees and the policy contained no such
provision, then the award of attorney's fees is proper and is not violative of
federal constitutional provisions if the action is brought in Florida by the
beneficiary. 5
Where conflicting demands are made by claimants, as beneficiaries,
under terms of a life policy and the company files cross complaints of inter-
pleader to actions against it, by reason of the insurer's admitting liability
under the policy but declining to pay either claimant until the dispute
between them had been settled by negotiation or judicial fiat, there was
no wrongful refusal to pay the policy proceeds, and no attorney's fees
would be assessed against the insurer under the statute.88
Under a "valued policy," where insurer had claims of both the vendor
and the vendee, as their respective interests may appear, and it refused
to pay the full amount of insurance, but instead, filed an interpleader
action and tendered the contract of "sale price of the property" into court,
it was in violation of the statute and attorney's fees would be awarded
against it.87
In an action against a fraternal benefit society for proceeds under its
policies, the beneficiary was not allowed recovery of attorney's fees because
73. Note 13 supra.
74. Note 40 supra.
75. Note 36 supra.
76. Note 13 sufra.
77. Glens Falls Indemnity Co. v. National Floor & Supply Co., 239 F.2d 412Sth Cir. 1957). This was an action on employees fidelity position bond and the
ecision turned on the courts interpretation of the bond provision relative to employee
dishonesty.
78. Note 4 su/ra.
79. Note 40 supra.
80. Note 13 supra.
81. Note 2 supra.
82. Notes 42 and 23 supra.
83. Note 12 supra.
84. FLA. STAT. § 625.08 (1957).
85, Slate v. Berkshire Life Ins. Co., 142 F. Supp. 691 (S.D. Fla. 1956).
86. Note 51 supra.
87. Note 43 supra.
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the statute does not apply to actions against fraternal societies. Unless
the society's benefit certificate contained a provision allowing such recovery,
none could be had. 8
In an action against the insurer by the insured, to recover the amount
of legal costs and attorney's fees which insured was compelled to incur in
defending an action against it, which the insurance company refused to
defend, the court allowed recovery of attorney's fees under the statute,
in addition to the damages sustained by the insured. 9
STATUTORY ENACTMENTS AND AMENDMENTS
As usual, Florida, being one of the forward looking states relative
to legislation providing for the welfare of its citizens and to make certain
that they have the most possible protection commensurate with constitu-
tional authority, has enacted many statutory provisions. For brevity's sake,
a digest and summary of the legislation enacted during the 1957 General
Sessions will be set forth in the footnotes herein. 0
88. Note 21 supra.
89. Virginia Surety Co. v. Russ, 86 So.2d. 643 (Fla. 1956).90. FLA. STAT. § 642.01 (1957). The requirement that cooperative or assessment
companies file form of policy containing estimated cost of contracts issued by them
has been deleted. FLA. STAT. § 642.031 (15) (16) (1953) has been repealed and
§ 642.03 (15) has been added which is as follows: "This subsection shall take effect
Oct. 1, 1956.' FLA. STAT. § 642.05 (1957) substitutes a new definition of industrial
accident and sickness insurance. FLA. STAT. § 642.06 (1957) has been amended relative
to blanket policies covering enumerated groups and gives the insurance commissioner
discretion in determining which provisions are favorable or unfavorable to insureds.
FLA. STAT. C. 644 (1957) has been amended to provide for licensing of agents, FLA.
STAT. c. 636 (1957) has been amended to provide for licensing and regulation of
adjusters and public adjusters. FLA. STAT. c. 627 (1957) has been amended. It is a
comprehensive enactment relative to requirements of persons applying for agency licenses.
FLA. STAT. c. 634 (1957) has been amended. It is a comprehensive enactment relative
to requirements of persons applying for licenses as life agents. FLA. STAT. C. 205 (1957)
has been amended to clarify taxation provisions. (Note: many more provisions were
enacted, but since many are amendments of administrative or regulatory provisions, it
was deemed not necessary to set them all out herein.)
